Dordt Digital Collections
Faculty Work Comprehensive List
2021

Bavinck's Doctrine of God: Absolute, Divine Personality
Gayle E. Doornbos
Dordt University, gayle.doornbos@dordt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work
Part of the Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation
Doornbos, G. E. (2021). Bavinck's Doctrine of God: Absolute, Divine Personality. Journal of Biblical and
Theological Studies, 6 (2), 311. Retrieved from https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/1420

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Dordt Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Work Comprehensive List by an authorized administrator of Dordt Digital Collections. For more
information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Bavinck's Doctrine of God: Absolute, Divine Personality
Keywords
Herman Bavinck, doctrinal theology, God, Trinity, scholarship

Disciplines
Christianity

This article is available at Dordt Digital Collections: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/1420

JBTS


Journal of
Biblical and
Theological
Studies

VOLUME 6 | ISSUE 2

Her man Bavinck (1854-1921)
A Centenary Celebr ation

Bavinck's Doctrine of God:
Absolute, Divine Personality
by Gayle Doornbos

J B T S 6 . 2 ( 2 0 2 1 ) : 3 11 – 3 4 8

Bavinck’s Doctrine of God: Absolute,
Divine Personality
Gayle Doornbos
Gayle Doornbos (PhD, University of St. Michael’s College) is an Associate
Professor of Theology at Dordt University. She has also taught in Calvin
Theological Seminary’s distance program. She lives in Sioux Center, IA.

Introduction 1
Given the Dutch Reformed Theologian Herman Bavinck’s insistence on the centrality
of the doctrine of the Trinity and the serious debates surrounding the doctrine at
the turn of the twentieth century, it is surprising that there remain few extended
treatments of Bavinck’s doctrine of God within secondary scholarship, especially
those situating his theology proper within his theological and philosophical context.
While there remains a widespread recognition of the trinitarian nature of Bavinck’s
theology as well as examinations of the triniform structure of various doctrines,2
the structure, shape, sources, and context of Bavinck’s doctrine of God remains
1. The material for this article is a combination of a paper given for the Advanced Theological
Studies Fellowship at Kampen Theological University and the author’s doctoral dissertation. The
materials have often been altered for the sake of this paper. See Gayle Doornbos, “Absolute Divine
Personality: Herman Bavinck and Isaak A. Dorner’s Doctrines of God,” Advanced Theological
Studies Fellowship, June 2019,” and Gayle Doornbos, “Herman Bavinck’s Trinitarian Theology:
The Ontological, Cosmological, and Soteriological Dimensions of the Doctrine of the Trinity” (PhD
Dissertation: University of St. Michael’s College, 2019).
2. Epistemology: Bruce Pass, “Herman Bavinck and the Problem of New Wine in Old
Wineskins,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 17, no. 4 (2015): 432–49; Scott Oliphint,
“Bavinck’s Realism, The Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” in Westminster Theological
Journal (2010): 359–90; and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on
Perception and Knowing God,” Harvard Theological Review 111, no. 1 (January 2018): 115–34.
Creation: See Clayton Bryant Cooke, “World-Formative Rest: Faithful Cultural Discipleship in a
Secular Age” (PhD Dissertation. Fuller Theological Seminary, 2015), 174–94; Wolter Huttinga,
“Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the Relation between
God and the World” (PhD Dissertation, Theologische Universiteit van de Gereformeerde Kerken
in Nederland te Kampen, 2014), 105–188; and Brian Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, chapter 1.
The Pactum Salutis: Anthony Andrew Hoekema, “Herman Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant”
(ThD Dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1953), 81–86 (NB: This dissertation follows
the page numbers of the re-typeset edition printed on demand from Full Bible Publications: Clover,
SC, 2007); Laurence R. O’Donnell III, “Not Subtle Enough: An Assessment of Modern Scholarship
on Bavinck’s Reformulation of the Pactum Salutis Contra ‘Scholastic Subtlety’” Mid America
Theological Journal 22 (2011): 89–106. Ethics: John Bolt, Imitatio Christi, 264–66. Soteriology:
Syd Heilema, “Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” chapter 3. The Motif of Grace
Restores Nature: See especially Eugene Heideman, Reason and Revelation, 191–95 and J. Veenhof,
Revelatie en Inspratie, 346ff. Formation of a Christian World-and-Life-View: See especially
Eugene Heideman, Reason and Revelation, 191–95 and J. Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspratie, 346ff.
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underexamined (at best) and unexamined (at worst).3 Why is this? Syd Hielema’s
treatment of Bavinck’s doctrine of God in his 1998 dissertation “Herman Bavinck’s
Eschatological Understanding of Redemption” illuminates at least two potential
reasons in older scholarship. First, describing the doctrine of the Trinity, Hielema
claims that Bavinck’s treatment is “certainly not remarkable or unusual in any way.”4
Second, describing Bavinck’s development of the divine attributes, Hielema claims
that he occasionally lapses into “abstract speculation concerning the nature of God”
and “scholastic detours.”5 While not indicative of all Bavinck scholarship, Hielema’s
estimation of Bavinck’s doctrine of God as unremarkable combined with a tendency
to fall prey to scholastic speculation is representative of a line of interpretation that
perceived Bavinck’s doctrine of God as both unoriginal and continuing traditional
forms within his theology proper even as he developed a triniform account of various
doctrines.6 And, depending on one’s stance towards classical articulations of the
doctrine of God, the unoriginal and particularly scholastic nature of Bavinck’s theology
proper are grounds for either its dismissal or its utilization as a rare, contemporary
example of classical theism to martial for one’s own theological project.7
Recent scholarship, however, has started to gesture in a different direction.
Following James Eglinton’s re-interpretation of Bavinck’s organic motif as rooted in
the doctrine of the Trinity, Cory Brock and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto have both indicated
that Bavinck’s doctrine of God might contain more originality than previously
thought, particularly Bavinck’s predication of God as ‘absolute personality.’ In
Sutanto’s, God and Knowledge, he notes,
If there is a potential and modest point of uniqueness in Bavinck’s treatment
of theology proper (outside of the organic motif and characterization of reality
in light of God’s triune being), it is Bavinck’s predication of the divine being
as the ‘absolute personality’ in response to modern theology’s emphasis on
the psychological depth that attends talks of personality.8
3. The main thrust of this author’s dissertation was to explore this area of Bavinck’s thought.
Several aspects of this article are derived or taken from the dissertation. See Gayle Doornbos,
“Herman Bavinck’s Trinitarian Theology.”
4. Hielema, “Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 112. Emphasis added.
5. Hielema, “Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 104, 124.
6. While utilized in a few publications prior to Trinity and Organism, Eglinton introduced
the term “triniform” to the discussion of Bavinck’s theology. This work is indebted to him for the
word “triniform,” especially its applicability to Bavinck’s theology. See James Eglinton, Trinity
and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T&T
Clark, 2012).
7. See, for example, Steven J. Duby, Divine Simplicity: A Dogmatic Account (New York:
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 30–31; Jordan P. Barrett, Divine Simplicity: A Biblical and Trinitarian
Account (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 109–113. James E. Dolezal, God without Parts: Divine
Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 9,
57–58, 68–89; and Hans Burger, Being in Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a
Reformed Perspective (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2009), Chapter 3.
8. Nathanial Gray Sutanto, God and Knowledge: Herman Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology
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For Sutanto, Bavinck’s utilization of ‘absolute personality’ indicates his engagement
with modern conceptions of personality.9 Similarly, Brock also notes Bavinck’s
predication of God as ‘absolute personality’ in his dissertation and utilizes it to
argue for the truly catholic, ecclesial, and ecumenical nature of Bavinck’s theology.
For Brock, this shows Bavinck’s utilization of modern sources within his doctrinal
construction and willingness to place traditional doctrines in modern theological
grammar. With regard to ‘absolute personality,’ Brock cites a quote by the German
mediating theologian Isaak Dorner and specifies Dorner as the source of Bavinck’s
predication of God as ‘absolute personality.’10 According to Brock, this utilization
and identification of God using the language of ‘absolute personality’ is enough to
suggest that Bavinck used “Aquinas and Calvin” but also “in moments . . . Dorner,
Schelling, and others, to construct his doctrine of God.”11
While both Brock and Sutanto gesture towards a potentially unique and
unexplored aspect within Bavinck’s doctrine of God, both are brief and modest.
Modest in that neither suggests that Bavinck’s predication of God as ‘absolute,
divine personality’ is indicative of a radical shift away from Bavinck’s development
of a Reformed, historic, and creedal doctrine of God. Brief in that both gesture to
this element with Bavinck so quickly that if their treatments of Bavinck were like
marvel movies, ‘absolute personality’ would be considered something like a Stan
Lee cameo: important but easy to miss. The lack of in-depth study is understandable
given the scope and aim of their projects, but it is unfortunate because the lack of
investigation leaves readers thinking Bavinck used the term ‘absolute personality’—a
favorite of nineteenth-century theistic personalists—when he specifically uses
the phrase absolute, divine personality (absolute, Goddelijke persoonlijkheid).12 It
also identifies Dorner as Bavinck’s potential source for this predication without
further investigation. However, even if they do not explore Bavinck’s attribution of
‘absolute, divine personality’ to God in-depth, they do (rightly) indicate that previous
scholarship may have missed important elements within Bavinck’s doctrine of
God—particularly in relation to Bavinck’s sources, Bavinck’s utilization of modern
(London: T&T Clark, 2020), 29.
9. Besides Sutanto and Brock, there is only one other writer who has mentioned Bavinck’s
treatment of absoluteness and personality in a significant way: Henry Jansen. In his book,
Relationality and the Concept of God, Jansen notes that Bavinck talks about God “as Absolute
and as personal.” See Henry Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, (Amsterdam: Rodophi,
1995), 48.
10. Cory Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern: Herman Bavinck’s Appropriation of Schleiermacher.”
(Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Edinburgh, 2017), 55.
11. Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern,” 55–6. Brock notably leaves this claim out of the published
version of his dissertation.
12. Bavinck’s exact phrasing is: “Absolute, Goddelijke persoonlijkheid.” Herman Bavinck,
Gereformeerde dogmatiek, Deel 2 (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1897), 275. Bavinck’s first edition of his
second volume will be referenced as GD for the remainder of this paper. His second, revised edition
will be referenced using the English transition of that edition.
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theological and philosophical grammar, and whether or not Bavinck’s use of modern
theological grammar is indicative of substantial developments within his doctrine of
God, merely restating classical doctrines in modern dress, or something in-between.
This essay seeks to fill this gap in Bavinck studies by exploring three pertinent
aspects of Bavinck’s utilization of ‘absoluteness’ and ‘personality’ in his doctrine
of God proper including his predication of God as ‘absolute, divine personality.’ In
doing so, it will seek to show—as Sutanto and Brock have suggested—that this aspect
of Bavinck’s thought represents a creative appropriation of modern philosophical
concepts from within his classical, Reformed tradition in order to develop it in and
for the context of modernity. It will do this by focusing on (1) situating Bavinck’s
doctrine of God within the context of the nineteenth century the philosophical
debate concerning absoluteness and personality, (2) identifying a few key places
where Bavinck seeks to reconcile absoluteness and personality in his development of
theology proper within the Reformed Dogmatics; and (3) pointing towards why this
area of Bavinck studies is a fruitful area for future study.

Absoluteness and Personality in Context
One of the urgent questions within nineteenth theology and philosophy was the
relationship between absoluteness and personality.13 Bequeathed to theology by
a series of complex developments in philosophical metaphysics running from
Descartes through Spinoza and Kant to Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling that increasingly
conceptualized God as Absolute and Infinite in contrast to that which is conditioned,
finite, and limited, one of the most significant questions facing theologians by the
nineteenth century was whether or not it was even conceptually possible to affirm
an Infinite, Absolute, personal God.14 Why? In the wake of Kant, Fichte, and others,
13. There is an ongoing debate concerning whether or not the debate was a necessary result
of an internal deficiency within the classical Christian doctrine of God. Many contemporary
commentators do see it as deeply rooted in a fundamental deficiency in the classical doctrine of
God. However, they disagree on which elements within the Christian doctrine of God caused this
debate to arise, the reasons why it developed as it did after the Enlightenment, and what doctrine of
God should be developed as a result. Barth, for example, argues that the problem is has its roots in
the theological tradition’s shift to discussing the nature and attributes of God prior to the doctrine of
the Trinity. Barth sees the increasing distance between De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino as creating
a wedge between God’s being and his personality that allowed denials of God’s personality and
assertion of his absoluteness to develop, especially in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Idealism.
Others, however, like Pannenberg and Clayton identify issues within Christian conceptualizations
of the divine but locate the origins of the nineteenth-century debate in Descartes. The treatment
of the debate in this article will follow Pannenberg and Clayton in locating the specific form of the
modern debate in Descartes. See Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, 288; Philip Clayton, The Problem
of God in Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2000), Chapter 2; and Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans. Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 19.
14. Philip Clayton, reflecting on this issue, has claimed the following: “Let me put it bluntly:
after Fichte it can no longer be presupposed that the traditional philosophical/theological doctrine
of an infinite personal God represents a defensible conceptual position. (Of course, that there
are difficulties with the idea of an infinite personal God does not prove that no solution can ever
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personality shifted such that personality was seen as a mode of finite existence,
simultaneously including notions of self-consciousness, self-determination, and
dependence.15 To ascribe personality to the Absolute would be to apply a condition
to the Absolute, thereby denying the free, unconditioned, and unbound nature of
the Absolute.16 To resolve this dilemma, some Idealist philosophers like Hegel and
Schelling sought to conceptualize the Absolute as a Self-positing, Subject who
becomes in and through positing that which is other (finite) and reconciling the finite
with itself (synthesis).
These developments in philosophical metaphysics presented Christian
theologians with a particularly difficult problem. Classically, Christian conceptions
of God affirmed both his absoluteness and personality in its affirmations that the
infinite God was also related to his creation. This relation did not bring about a change
in God, but it was still ‘personal’ insofar as it was conscious and willed.17 Thus,
several proposals, many of which reworked the doctrine of God, arose throughout
the nineteenth century in response. These proposals ranged from identifying the
personality of God as purely symbolic—something that is subjectively important for
the religious life but not philosophically valid—to trying to recover personality in
God by ascribing personality to God in an absolute sense.

Bavinck: Absolute, Divine Personality
To grapple with the relationship between absoluteness and personality was to attend
to the philosophical and theological questions of the day. It was within this context
that Bavinck wrote and developed his understanding of how to reconcile absoluteness
and personality as well as described God as ‘absolute, divine personality.’ As such,
it is important to remember that as we look at Bavinck’s own response, he was not
the only one who perceived the issues and potentially problematic implications
be found).” For Clayton, Fichte made the classical Christian description of an infinite, absolute
personal God an issue to defend conceptually rather than one to accept and articulate. Clayton,
Modern Concept of God, 447.
15. See J.G. Fichte, “On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance,” in J.G.
Fichte and the Atheism Dispute (1798–1800), ed. Yolanda Estes and Curtis Bowman, trans. Curtis
Bowan, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 21–29.
16. For a summary of this development, see Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God,
Chapter 3, “Self-consciousness and Subjectivity.”
17. This is not to say that classical conceptions of God were monolithic. However, there were
tenants of classical conceptions of God that many theologians shared. One such tenant was that
God’s infinity and his unchangeable nature did not exclude the possibility of creating and relating
to a non-divine creation. This relation, however, was not conceptualized under the category of God
as a singular “person” because “person” was traditionally utilized in reference to the three persons
of the Trinity. See Clayton, Modern Concept of God, 447, and Craig A. Carter, Contemplating
God with the Great Tradition: Recovering Trinitarian Classical Theism (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2021), Part 1.
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of this debate, nor was he the only one who found insights within contemporary
philosophy for developing his own theological reconciliation of absoluteness and
personality. However, his approach can be classified as a specifically Neo-Calvinist
response, as he seeks to develop the Reformed tradition from within for the sake of
his modern context.

What’s Old is New Again:
Absoluteness and Personality . . . A Contemporary Question?
Before looking at Bavinck’s articulation of the relationship between absoluteness and
personality and the role it plays in his systematic treatment of the doctrine of God,
it is vital to examine how Bavinck presents and situates the contemporary debate.
Why? Because Bavinck’s presentation and estimation that the contemporary debate
over absoluteness and personality as a novel manifestation of a perennial theological
issue is one of the grounds that he utilizes to draw upon the theological tradition
and develop it.
Bavinck’s works, from the first edition of the second volume of his Reformed
Dogmatics (Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (1897)) to his 1911 speech “Modernism and
Orthodoxy,” contain several statements that reveal Bavinck’s growing understanding
of where the contemporary debate should be situated within the history of theology.
There are three particularly illuminating statements—one from the first edition
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (1897), one from the second edition of Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek (1908), and one from “Modernism and Orthodoxy”—that demonstrate
Bavinck’s continued interest and awareness of the importance of the debate as well
as a subtle development in his assessment of it.18
First, in the first edition of the second volume of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,
following a section that traces the apparent contradiction between absoluteness and
personality in contemporary philosophy, particularly following Kant and Fichte,
Bavinck makes the following assessment: “at the bottom this antithesis between
absoluteness and personality is none other than that which in Christian theology
was always felt and expressed in negative and positive (apophatic and cataphatic)
theology.”19 In other words, according to Bavinck, the historical Christian
affirmation of the unknowability of the divine essence transposed into modern key
is absoluteness, albeit with one key difference. Unlike contemporary philosophical
18. The adjective, subtle, is a crucial one here. Bavinck’s statements and connection of
absoluteness and personality to the duality of God’s incomprehensibility and knowability in
revelation present in each one of these works. However, his does develop statements through these
works that provide clarity or summarize elements implicit within earlier treatments.
19. “In het wezen der zaak is deze tegenstelling tusschen absoluut en persoonlijk geen andere,
dan die in de christelijke theologie altijd werd gevoeld en uitgedrukt werd in de negatieve en
positieve, de apophatische en de kataphatische theologie.” GD, 18. The transition above is from the
English translation of the second edition, in which this statement remained the same. See Bavinck,
RD, 2:46.
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accounts of the unknowability of the Absolute, Christian theology while affirming the
incomprehensibility of the divine essence, does not deny the possibility of knowing
God through revelation.20
Bavinck expands this emphasis on divine revelation, found throughout his first
edition, in the second, revised edition of the Reformed Dogmatics. Published in 1908,
the second edition contains many additions, one of which is illuminating with regard
to Bavinck’s assessment of the contemporary debate. Already situating it within the
perennial theological articulation of negative and positive theology, Bavinck plunks
the contemporary question squarely within the waters of Scripture. Following a
section tracing the dynamic between the revelation of a personal, relational God and
a God who dwells in inaccessible light in Scripture, Bavinck writes: “or to put this
into modern theological language, in Scripture the personality and absoluteness of
God go hand in hand.”21 This section makes a clear and striking claim that the duality
present in Scripture, translated into modern theological grammar is absoluteness and
personality. Bavinck also adds a secondary claim to the assertion that the “moment
we step outside of the domain of…special revelation in Scripture… the unity of
absoluteness and personality of God is broken.”22 Thus, according to Bavinck, the
contemporary debate is not novel but a new manifestation of an enduring theological
problem of how to do justice the duality revealed in Scripture. Furthermore, Bavinck
makes it clear that because Scripture alone maintains the unity of absoluteness
and personality, the Christian conception of the divine is the only place where
these two can be unified. Outside of revelation the divine is conceived of as either
Absolute, direct knowledge of whom is unattainable, or the divine is made personal,
knowledge of whom is equated with human cognition or self-consciousness.23 To
back up this claim, Bavinck repurposes a section from the first edition that he used to
trace historical attestation of divine incomprehensibility in non-Christian traditions
to demonstrate how the unity of God’s personality and absoluteness immediately
disintegrates outside of special revelation’s domain.
Finally, in “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” Bavinck makes a statement that clearly
ties his previous assessments together. In the midst of his argument against the charge
that he and other neo-Calvinists were neither orthodox nor modern but rather using
orthodox terms and filling them with modern content, Bavinck claims in this lengthy
statement is worth quoting in full:

20. Bavinck, RD, 2:48–49.
21. Bavinck, RD, 2:34.
22. Bavinck, RD, 2:34. This phrase is an addition to the second edition.
23. Of note in Bavinck’s assessment is his refusal to claim that the God of the philosophers
is solely the Absolute God whose being is unknowable and distant. Rather it is both the Absolute,
unknowable God, distant and distinct from creation (deistic) and the personal one, totally knowable
and relatable (pantheistic) that Bavinck equates with the God of the philosophers.
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One shall soon make the surprising discovery that the alleged contrariety
[between absoluteness and personality, the God of science and the God of
religion] does not exist between Scriptures and contemporary theology and
neither does it exist between the old and the new Calvinism but that it appears
in Scripture itself and is encountered in every theologian…In principle the
question has always been there and it comes down to this…How can the
infinite eternal being, that is the power in all power and the life of all life be at
the same time the gracious, and the caring Father of his children?24

Here Bavinck claims that the question raised within contemporary philosophy and
theology is not a new question but rather one that every theologian must wrestle with
because Scripture and God’s divine revelation itself presents God as “incomparable,
indescribable, infinite and eternal,” and “… the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and
in him the Father of all his children.”25 Thus, according to Bavinck, the seemingly
novel contemporary debate is not new. Rather, just like his claim in his Philosophy
of Revelation that worldviews cycle in “rhythmic waves” throughout the history of
thought,26 so too the debate concerning absoluteness and personality is not unique
but a recurring challenge for theologians to grapple with. Within the context of
“Modernism and Orthodoxy,” Bavinck use this to argue that the conflict is not
between the new Calvinism and the old nor Scripture and contemporary theology
but rather is one found in God’s self-revelation that challenges theologians of every
age to do justice to the unity of God’s revelation of himself as absolute and personal.27
It also shows Bavinck’s continued engagement with the questions of absoluteness and
personality and his continued development of the concepts.
Bavinck’s way of casting the contemporary questions swirling around
absoluteness and personality within Scripture and the tradition provides the impetus
for him to enter the debate and engage it in a particular way. First, he firmly grounds
24. Herman Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” trans. Bruce R. Pass, Bavinck Review 7
(2016): 96–97. This translation was recently published along with three other translated articles in
Herman Bavinck and Bruce R. Pass, On Theology: Herman Bavinck’s Academic Orations (Leiden:
Brill, 2021).
25. Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” 97.
26. Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation: A New Annotated Edition, ed. Cory Brock
and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto (Grand Rapids: Hendrickson, 2018), 30–31: “They rather recur in
rhythmical waves, more or less intermingle, and subsist side by side. Thus, Greek philosophy was
born out of the Orphic theology, passed over into the naturalism of the old nature-philosophy, and
became humanistic in the Sophists and the wisdom-philosophy of Socrates. Plato in his doctrine of
ideas went back to the old theology and to Pythagoras; but, after Aristotle, his philosophy gave way
to the naturalistic systems of Epicurus and the Stoics; and these, in turn, by way of reaction, gave
birth to the teachings of the sceptical and mystical schools. Christianity gave theism the ascendancy
for many centuries; but modern philosophy, which began with Descartes and Bacon, assumed in
ever increasing measure a naturalistic character till Kant and Fichte in the ego once more took
their starting point from man. After a brief period of the supremacy of the theistic philosophy in
the nineteenth century, naturalism in its materialistic or pantheistic form resumed its sway, only to
induce during these recent years a new return to Kant and the principles of humanism.”
27. Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” 96–102.
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both the problem and the solution within the bounds of revelation. The problem
arises because of the unity and duality of God’s revelation. God’s revelation is one,
but he is revealed as both known and unknown, named and nameless, immanent
and transcendent.28 Second, his claim that this is not a novel issue allows Bavinck
to reach into the past and use the theological tradition as a guide and resource for
addressing his contemporary context. Finally, grounding his response in Scripture
and the theological tradition also allows Bavinck to incorporate genuine insights from
contemporary theology and philosophy.29 While this approach may seem to indicate
a tendency to simply parrot the tradition, for Bavinck it actually opens up the space
within which new insights can be appropriated.30 Rather it is the opposite; because
Scripture provides the framework and the tradition serves as a guide, Bavinck is free
to take in and utilize contemporary insights. According to Bavinck, there is no need
to pit the theological tradition against theological development.

Bavinck’s Absolutely Personal, Triune God
Central to Bavinck’s reconciliation of absoluteness and personality is to show how the
Scriptural reality of God as hidden and revealed, incomprehensible and knowable,
unnamed and named are not contradictory but ‘go hand and hand’ to create a uniquely
Christian understanding of the triune God who is personal and absolute. To do so,
Bavinck attends to a series of epistemological and ontological issues throughout his
doctrine of God proper. While his specific treatment and engagement with the debate
occur within particular sections, the systematic conclusions he draws undergirds his
positive development of the divine essence, attributes, and persons.
Bavinck’s attempts to reconcile absoluteness and personality begin
epistemologically at the beginning of the second volume of the Reformed Dogmatics.
He makes two-fold epistemological affirmation that he roots in Scripture: God is
incomprehensible yet knowable. According to Bavinck, Scripture attests to the
distance between God and creation and affirms the mysterious and ineffable nature of
God, but “it nevertheless sets forth a doctrine of God that upholds his knowability.”31
Scripture does not seek to prove God’s existence, “but simply presupposes it.”32 It
presents God as “a personal being, self-existent, with a life, consciousness, and will
28. See Bavinck, RD, vol. 2.
29. Bavinck himself identifies this approach to philosophical conceptions of the divine as
derived from the theological method of the church fathers: “The church father already observed that
this doctrine [Trinity] rejects the errors of, while absorbing the elements of truth inherent in, Deism
and pantheism, monism and polytheism.” Bavinck, RD, 2:331.
30. Bavinck himself notes that he does not simply wish to parrot the tradition in forward to the
first edition of the Gereformeerde dogmatiek: “To cherish the ancient simply because it is ancient is
neither Reformed nor Christian.” Herman Bavinck, “Foreword to the First Edition (volume 1) of the
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,” trans. John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010), 10.
31. Bavinck, RD, 2:30.
32. Bavinck, RD, 2:30.

339

Journal of Biblical and Theological Studies 6.2

of his own, not confined to nature but highly exalted above it, the Creator of heaven
and earth” who can and does “manifest himself” on earth, is personally involved
in creation, reveals himself, and can be truly known.33 God is transcendent and
immanent. He is an ineffable, incomprehensible, “adorable mystery,” or Absolute;
and he is knowable, or personal.34 He is, according to Bavinck, absolute and personal.35
The problem with contemporary philosophy, according to Bavinck, is not that it
utilizes absoluteness and personality but that it rends asunder what Scripture presents
together and thereby develops a reductionistic and problematic conception of the
divine.36 Contemporary philosophy either renders God as the Absolute—the One
who is unknowable and unnameable or God as a Person who is fully known. God
is either conceived of as Absolute and unconscious but not personal or personal and
self-conscious but not absolute.37 One leads to agnosticism concerning the divine,
and the other leads to rationalism.38 According to Bavinck, these are not just noetic
positions but rest in certain ontological commitments that have religious implications.
Assessing them, Bavinck identifies each position as the outworking of either deism
or pantheism. To assume that God is unknowable is to simultaneously claim that the
world is devoid of the divine (Deism), and to assume that God is nothing more than
an enlarged human person is to claim that the world is divinized (pantheism).39
33. Bavinck, RD, 2:30.
34. Bavinck, RD, 2:49. Mystery is an important motif in Bavinck’s work. As Bruce R. Pass’s
recent article has pointed out, Bavinck utilizes mystery throughout his corpus in three different
ways. First, utilizing the NT sense of the term, Bavinck often defines mystery as that which was
hidden by God but now made known to believers. Thus, something mysterious is that which was
previously hidden but has now been made known. Second, Bavinck uses the term mystery to denote
things that are presently unknown. Bavinck uses this sense to highlight the limits of scientific
knowledge. Third, he uses mystery to denote that which can be apprehended by human reason
but remain indemonstrable to human reason. As Pass articulates, these three uses of reason are
important and prominent in Bavinck’s treatment and are fitting to the epistemological treatment
of divine absoluteness and personality found in this chapter. See Bruce R. Pass, “Revelation and
Reason in Herman Bavinck,” in Westminster Theological Journal 80 (2018): 250–51.
35. Bavinck, RD, 2:34.
36. Bavinck, RD, 2:34–6.
37. Bavinck, RD, 2:34–35. Bavinck engages Islam and Buddhism in this section. While he does
often mention religion and trace alternative conceptions of various doctrines, he has often been
criticized for failing to engage seriously with other religious. On many occasions, this critique
is warranted, especially with regard to Bavinck’s development of worldview and epistemological
typologies. However, this is a delightful example of his knowledge of and engagement with other
religious traditions. See Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 43.
38. There is an overlap here between Bavinck’s assessment of divine absoluteness and
personality and his later discussion on Arianism and Sabellianism. Fitting with his assessment that
every error in doctrine is at its core an error in the doctrine of the Trinity, Bavinck’s articulation
of the inability to reconcile divine absoluteness and personality bears striking similarities to his
assessment of Arian and Sabellian approaches to the Trinity. See Bavinck, RD, 2:291–96.
39. Bavinck’s use of pantheism needs to be nuanced. Occasionally, he will use pantheism to
refer to understandings of the world in which there is no differentiation between God and the world.
However, he also uses the term pantheism to describe what is more commonly referred to now
as panentheism wherein God and the world are distinct but are part of one, God-world complex.

340

Gayle Doornbos: Bavinck's Doctrine of God: Absolute, Divine Personality

However, even though Bavinck sees agnosticism and rationalism as the noetic
correlates of deism and pantheism, he is quick to point out that they are really
two sides of the same coin. Neither can maintain immanence and transcendence,
divine incomprehensibility and knowability, absoluteness and personality. And,
because neither can hold together what Scripture presents as unified, they constantly
merge and collapse into one another. Bavinck is particularly interested in the way
agnosticism collapses into and ends up “justify[ing] a pantheistic God-concept.”40 In
making the world mundane, agnosticism quickly tries to re-divinize the world by
claiming that symbolic or representational knowledge of the Absolute is possible.
However, it still denies personal consciousness and purposive intent to the Absolute.
The Absolute remains unknown, incapable of revelation, even as it turns to a fairly
well-defined God-concept.41 Thinly veiled here is Bavinck’s criticism of approaches
that deny objective knowledge of the divine and treat theology’s knowledge as merely
symbolic (Schleiermacher). As agnosticism and rationalism, deism and pantheism
develop and merge together in the history of philosophy and religion, they present
God as either a “cold abstraction that freezes religion and destroys the religion of the
heart,” or as “is nothing but an enlarged version of a human person.”42
While criticizing contemporary positions, Bavinck does not simply discard the
insights of contemporary philosophy. Most strikingly, Bavinck judges the agnosticism
of Kant and Fichte as a helpful corrective to overly rationalistic theological discourse.
However, he rejects the corresponding claims that God (or the Absolute) remains
completely behind the epistemological veil. Bavinck also agrees with Fichte’s
assessment that “Personality is a concept borrowed from the human realm and
hence, when applied to God, always to some extent falls short.”43 According to
Bavinck, Fichte’s claim concerning the limitations of all God-concepts is helpful not
only as a corrective to theistic philosophers who sought to reconcile absoluteness
and personality by applying the new philosophical and psychological conceptions

Bavinck will often categorize panentheistic theologians and philosophers as fundamentally agnostic
with regard to the divine. What he is not doing in these cases is arguing that they represent deistic
philosophical conceptions. He is, however, trying to show how agnosticism collapses into and often
ends up articulating a pantheistic or, in modern terms, panentheistic view of God and the world.
For a more thorough treatment and definition of various types of panentheism see John Cooper,
Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007).
40. Bavinck, RD, 2:52.
41. Bavinck, RD, 2:52. It is clear throughout this section that Bavinck is far less concerned with
the traditional, modernist deists like Descartes, Locke, and Hume. He is much more concerned with
the late-modern agnosticism of the Absolute that still claimed to have arrived at some type of Godconcept. In this concern, Bavinck is in accord with Kuyper. See Abraham Kuyper, Pantheism’s
Destruction of Boundaries, trans. J. Hendrick de Vries (n.p.: 1893).
42. Bavinck, RD, 2:47.
43. Bavinck, RD, 2:50. Emphasis added.
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of person and personality to God but also as a reminder about the anthropomorphic
nature of all human language for the divine.44
Fichte’s problem, however, according to Bavinck, is that he did not take
his argument about human predication of the divine far enough. Thus, he uses
Fichte’s argument and pushes it further to show that the radical anthropomorphic
and analogical nature of all human language for God—including the predication
‘Absolute.’ This argument opens the door for Bavinck to affirm the possibility
of predicating attributes to the divine based on God’s revelation through a rearticulate the classical Calvinistic doctrine of divine accommodation.45 Following
that, Bavinck appropriates and redefines absoluteness and personality from within
the tradition and situates it within his distinction between archetypal and ectypal
theology as he develops his account of God’s attributes.46 First, God’s absoluteness
becomes an affirmation of divine incomprehensibility, and aseity and personality
become an affirmation of the possibility of attributing positive characteristics to the
divine being, relatively, analogically, and anthropomorphically on the basis of the
self-conscious, purposive revelation of the divine being.47
Furthermore, Bavinck argues, divine absoluteness should not be defined via
abstraction and negation; it is not divine boundlessness, lifelessness, or infinite
expression in all directions, as in Fichte and other idealist philosophers. God’s
44. Theistic personalism represented a widespread and varied nineteenth-century movement
to reconcile divine absoluteness and personality. It has also been widely influential in twentiethcentury dialogues concerning the nature of the divine. Brian Davies in his book Introduction
to the Philosophy of Religion identifies theistic personalism in contrast to classical theism and
defines them as the two different approaches to God. While Davies primarily focuses on theistic
personalism in analytic philosophy, the contrast between theistic personalism and classical theism
is one helpful way to map the landscape of contemporary theological and philosophical dialogues
concerning the divine. See Brian Davies, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), Chapter 1 “The Concept of God.” For a standard treatment of philosophical
personalism, particularly theistic personalism and its worldview see Keith Yandell, “Personalism,”
in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig (Taylor and Francis), accessed
February 19, 2019, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/personalism/v-1
45. Bavinck, RD, 2:50.
46. Bavinck, RD, 2:128. Bavinck’s use of analogy presupposes the distinction and difference
between the creator and the creature even as it grounds the possibility of divine predication. The
analogy is grounded in God’s action of creation by which he communicates himself. However,
even as creatures imitate the divine and articulate truths about him by echoing his divine speech
in creation, they remain radically different. There is an infinite gulf between the divine and
creation, Infinite and finite, eternity and time in Bavinck. The analogy is derived from God’s
divine initiative, his self-communication in creation. Bavinck uses the concept of God placing the
words on human lips as a way to articulate the truth that no knowledge of God is possible unless
he has revealed himself. Furthermore, according to Bavinck, even though God remains distinctly
different than anything in the world, everything in the world is like him. Therefore, creaturely
language is a divinely given gift by which human beings come to know God analogically and
anthropomorphically. This metaphor, however, should not be equated with Barth’s articulation of
the analogia fidei. Bavinck is not presenting a view in which God seizes language by revelation and
ascribes meaning to it ‘from without.’
47. Bavinck, RD, 2:49.
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divine absoluteness is the fullness of the triune life itself apart from creation. It is an
analogical and anthropomorphic description of the fullness of the divine being who
is beyond comprehension, or in scriptural language, ‘dwells in inaccessible light.’48
But God is not just absolute; he is also personal.49 God does not become a personality;
personality is a description of the absolute Being of God and that which affirms the
knowability of God because it includes self-consciousness and self-determination.50
God’s self-consciousness and self-determination are absolute because it is “equally
deep and rich, equally infinite, as his being.”51 Understood in this way, Bavinck claims,
God is both absolute and personal, incomprehensible and knowable, transcendent
and immanent. Thus, absoluteness and personality become a frame through which
Bavinck presents the divine attributes. God is absolute in his personality and personal
in his absoluteness. God’s divine personality not only grounds the possibility of
knowledge because the predication of personality indicates God’s self-consciousness
and self-determination but also affirms a true knowledge of the divine. God is able
to reveal himself in a relative way to creatures that which he knows absolutely in his
essence. Personality, however, remains an anthropomorphic description of the divine
being, for God’s essence is absolute and beyond comprehension or grasp.
Although Bavinck affirms the unity of absoluteness and personality of God and
utilizes these concepts to frame and undergird his treatment of the divine attributes,
when he moves to his treatment of the divine essence, he is hesitant about defining
it as ‘absolute personality.’ Why? Bavinck gives two reasons. First, he is wary of
using ‘absolute personality’ as a unifying ontological concept because it easily leads
to thinking God is ‘unipersonal’ rather than “tripersonal.”52 Second, Bavinck argues
that describing the divine essence primarily as ‘absolute personality’ often leads to
collapsing the analogical interval between God and humanity.53 Thus, rather than
following theistic personalists, like Isaac Dorner, Bavinck prefers to define God’s
essence as absolute being because he sees this definition as allowing all of the
other attributes (fatherhood, personality, love, wisdom, goodness, etc.) to be fully
encompassed because they are seen (anthropologically and analogously) as belonging
to God’s being in an absolute sense.54 As such, Bavinck sees ‘absolute Being’ as
48. Bavinck, RD, 2:34.
49. Personality, then, is not just the relatability and knowability of God but the ontological
ground that makes knowing and relating to God possible. Key here for Bavinck is the notion that
divine, infinite self-knowledge and self-determination are not something God achieves through a
dialectical, dynamic process in time, but they are eternally and infinitely present in the divine being.
50. Bavinck, RD, 2:49.
51. Bavinck, RD, 2:49.
52. Bavinck’s judgement here is correct. Many nineteenth-century theistic personalists utilized
the concept of personality to develop distinctly non-trinitarian accounts of God. See Powell, The
Trinity in German Thought, 166–171.
53. Bavinck, RD, 2:122.
54. Bavinck, RD, 2:123.
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being able to do justice to the rich and manifold self-revelation in Scripture of God
more than ‘absolute personality.’55
While careful not to define the divine essence as ‘absolute personality,’ Bavinck
does creatively appropriate absoluteness and personality to develop an Augustinian
yet contemporary account of the relationship between the divine essence and
persons. Keenly aware of the consequences of applying modern philosophical and
psychological conceptions of personality univocally to theological articulations of
the divine life, Bavinck appropriates the language of personality in his De Deo Trino
with constant appeals to the broad historical consensus concerning the doctrine
of the Trinity across ecclesiastical traditions. His goal is not novelty; his goal is to
communicate the deeply historic, broadly catholic doctrine of the Trinity in and for
modernity. However, while significant in his approach, Bavinck’s development here
opens the doors for some confusion, particularly because he starts to utilize person
and personality in multiple ways.
First, in his De Deo Trino Bavinck does not dismiss his earlier usage of
personality and affirmation of divine self-consciousness and self-determination. In
fact, as he highlights at the beginning of his doctrine of God, “It is certain that God is
a person.”56 Quick to qualify that this means that God is “a conscious and free willing
being, not confined to the world but exalted high above it.” Bavinck seems to equate
personhood with intellect and volition. Insofar as these are absolute (as deep and as
rich as his being), Bavinck is able to describe God as personal.57
Second, Bavinck explores the use of contemporary concepts of personality
within the doctrine of the Trinity. In his locus on the Trinity, Bavinck seeks to address
how “personality” can be utilized within trinitarian theology.58 Building on his previous
55. Bavinck’s description of the divine essence has several overlaps with Thomas’s account
of the divine as actus purus, pure act. Bavinck does utilize this definition of the divine being in
a few places. But, his appeal to this definition is one way that he articulates the divine essence
in his writing. Yet, it is not the only way he conceptualizes the divine essence. In this section, he
purposively utilizes absolute Being as his description of the divine life to articulate the fullness and
richness of the one divine Being. In fact, in this section, Bavinck articulates God as the one in whom
being and living coincide. Thus, while Bavinck does show an affinity for Thomas’s account of God
as actus purus, he does not articulate or develop it in the same manner. Bavinck’s affinity with
Thomas here is not surprising as many of the Reformed Scholastics drew on Thomas’s Aristotelian
metaphysics in their doctrines of God. Bavinck’s description of the divine life shows his historical
rootedness within the Reformed orthodoxy but also his willingness to appropriate it in and for
modernity. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (New York: Benzinger, 1948), I, Q.ii.A.3; Idem Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton
C. Pegis et al., ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P. (New York: Hanover House, 1955–57), I, c. 17. See also
Synopsis Purioris Theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, vol. 1 Disputations 1–23, eds.
Dolf te Velde et al., trans. Riemer A. Faber (Leiden: Brill, 2014), Disputation 1. For a good treatment
of Reformed orthodoxy’s relationship to Aristotelianism see Richard A. Muller, “Reformation,
Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” in
Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 (2001): 306–325 and Muller, PRRD, I. 71–73.
56. Bavinck, RD, 2:30.
57. See Bavinck, RD, 2:30, 49.
58. Bavinck adds a significant amount of material to this part of his dogmatics in the second
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affirmations in his De Deo Uno, Bavinck maintains the contemporary conception of
personality as that which includes self-knowledge (or self-consciousness) and selfdetermination. Second, he also adopts contemporary notions of the structure of selfconsciousness, especially in its Schleiermachian form. He writes: “Personality in
humans arises only because they are subjects who confront themselves as an object
and unite the two (subject and object) in an act of self-consciousness. Hence, three
moments (constituents) constitute the essence of human personality.”59 However, in
affirming these elements of modern notions of personality, Bavinck also recognizes
the problem that contemporary language (even his own) poses to the doctrine of the
Trinity. If God is and has been revealed as a person, or personal, a being having
self-consciousness and self-determination, then what does one do with the traditional
language person in reference to the Father, Son, and Spirit? Is God both unipersonal
and tripersonal? If personality is something that “arises” in and through the distinct
moments, does God become? Does personhood imply that the Father, Son, and
Spirit each have self-knowledge and self-determination of their own? Is God a oneconscious and triconscious being?60
It is here that Bavinck seeks to do two things to maintain the usefulness of
contemporary notions of personality and relationality while not opening the door to
tritheism or introducing the notion of becoming into the divine essence. First, Bavinck
strongly opposes the predication of distinct self-knowledge and self-determination to
the Father, Son, and Spirit. The persons are not separate personalities who each have
distinct self-knowledge and self-volition and become on the ord.61 In other words,
the predication of intellect and volition belongs to the divine essence. Furthermore,
Bavinck opposes conceptualizing the persons as mere revelational ‘modes’ of the
one divine personality whereby the Father, Son, and Spirit are mere names for the
same divine personality. This, according to Bavinck, would lead to Sabellianism.62
However, even though it starts to muddy the waters, he suggests that “person” is still
the best term theology has for the Father, Son, and Spirit. Appealing to Augustine,
Bavinck argues that theology uses the term person “not to express what that is only
not to be silent.”63 And, because Scripture reveals God to us as Father, Son, and
edition, showing a development in his thought and further engagement with contemporary notions
of personality.
59. Bavinck, RD, 2:303.
60. Although Bavinck never states it this way, one can hear why Cornelius Van Til, who drew
heavily from Bavinck to articulate his doctrine of God, writes “God is a one-conscious being, and
yet, he is also a triconscious being.” Bavinck does not make this assertion, but it could be derived
from statements like, God’s personality unfolds tripersonaly. See Cornelius Van Til, Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 2nd ed. (Philipsburg: P&R, 2007), 348.
61. Had Bavinck been writing today, he would have likely identified this position as social
trinitarianism at best and tritheism at worst.
62. See Bavinck, RD, 2:294.
63. Bavinck, RD, 2:302. This is a direct citation from Augustine, The Trinity, V, 9; VI, 10. See
also, Our Reasonable Faith, 158.
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Holy Spirit, theology cannot be silent but must acknowledge the three-fold nature of
the divine being.
According to Bavinck, then, the term person is used within trinitarian dogma
“simply [to] mean that the three persons in the divine being are not ‘modes’ but have
a distinct existence of their own.”64 Drawing from Richard of St. Victor, Bavinck
affirms each person as an “incommunicable existence of the divine nature” in relation
to their personal properties.65 The difference between the persons is not in essence but
in their mutual relations to one another, meaning the distinctions between the persons
arise from personal properties known through their mutual relations.66 Person does
not refer to the individual self-consciousness or self-determination of the Father, Son,
and Spirit. Instead, it refers to the distinct existence of each person as they subsist
within the absolute Being of God, who is the triune, absolutely personal, God.
Rather than identifying each person in the Trinity as an individuated personality
(having a self-consciousness and volition of their own) within the divine essence,67
Bavinck sees within contemporary conceptions of personality a helpful analogy
to understand the relationship between the essence and the persons. Rooting his
assessment within the tradition, Bavinck argues, along with Augustine that the divine
essence is not derived from the person of the Father but from the unity of the divine
essence, which unfolds tripersonally as one, divine, triune being.68 Bavinck insists,
“It belongs to God’s very essence to be triune. In that regard personhood is identical
with God’s being itself . . . Each person, therefore, is identical with the entire being
and equal to the other two or all three together.”69 The essence is not a fourth thing
alongside the Father, Son, and Spirit, but the essence of God is triune. Or, in modern
theological grammar, “The divine being is tripersonal precisely because it is the
absolute, divine personality.”70
64. Bavinck, RD, 2:302 According to Bavinck, this is the truth that both Boethius and Richard
of St. Victor were trying to communicate. He situates his definition closer to Richard of St. Victor,
but more significantly he sees any further definition of person within trinitarian dogma as ultimately
expressing the simple truth that the persons do not introduce substantive differences within the
divine being but that are modes of existence within the divine being.
65. Bavinck, RD, 2:302. Bavinck cites Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, IV, 21.
66. Bavinck, RD, 2:305. Bavinck describes the personal properties in classical trinitarian
language: paternity (unbegotteness, active generation, active spiration), filiation or sonship (passive
generation, active spiration), and procession or passive spiration. None of the mutual relations add
anything substantially to the divine essence.
67. Bavinck’s treatment of the persons of the Trinity does occasionally utilize the term
personality to refer to a person within the Godhead. This is particularly the case with the Spirit.
This is one of the areas in which Bavinck’s utilization of modern concepts of personality and his
desire to maintain the language of person in reference to the Father, Son, and Spirit can cause some
confusion.
68. Bavinck, RD, 2:305. Unfolding should not be equated with becoming here. Instead, Bavinck
utilizes unfolding as a dynamic term to indicate the fullness of the divine life, which is a fullness
that exists in three persons eternally.
69. Bavinck, RD, 2:304.
70. Bavinck, RD, 2:302.
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Bavinck sees within contemporary notions of personality two helpful analogies
to aid in human, analogical understanding of the triune divine personality. Follows
what he perceives as Augustinian logic, Bavinck finds faint analogies of the divine
life within contemporary philosophical articulations of the structure of selfconsciousness. First, just like human personality unfolds, so too “the absolute, divine
personality arises out of and by means of the unfolding of the three persons. Yet,
unlike human personality, divine personality arises simultaneously and completely.
Second, human personality, Bavinck argues is far too rich to be embodied “in a
single individual.”71 Humanity, according to Bavinck, unfolds the riches of human
personality collectively and communally. Each person is a diverse manifestation of
what it means to be human, and therefore the unity of human personality only comes
in and through the unity of the whole.72 In God, however, “the unfolding of his being
into personality coincides with that of his being unfolded into three persons. The three
persons are the one divine personality brought to complete self-unfolding, a selfunfolding arising out of, by the agency of, and within the divine being.”73 In humans,
personality unfolds through time and collectively; in God, it unfolds instantaneously
and in his triune being. There is no becoming in the divine essence, but there is
an eternal unfolding that “immediately, absolutely, and completely convinces with,
and includes, the unfolding of his being into persons.”74 In sum, personality and
the structure of self-consciousness are faint analogies of the divine life. One can
hear echoes of Schleiermacher’s analysis of the structure of consciousness as well as
Schelling and Hegel’s accounts of the unfolding of the Triune life. But one can also
see Bavinck’s efforts to guard against notions of divine becoming as well as anything
that opens the door to tritheism even as he describes the trinitarian being of God as
tripersonal and absolute, divine personality.75

Conclusion
Bavinck’s systematic reconciliation of absoluteness and personality is an integral
aspect of his doctrine of God proper. Brock and Sutanto were right to highlight
this aspect, and it shows that Hielema’s earlier estimation of Bavinck’s doctrine of
God needs to be revised. Even in this brief investigation of Bavinck’s doctrine of
God, one can see that Bavinck weaves absoluteness and personality throughout his
systematic development and the systematic conclusions he draws undergirds his
positive development of the divine essence, attributes, and persons. Bavinck utilizes
the grammar of absoluteness and personality to express his two-fold epistemological
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Bavinck, RD, 2:303.
Bavinck, RD, 2:303.
Bavinck, RD, 2:303.
Bavinck, RD, 2:305.
Bavinck, RD, 2:302.
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claim concerning knowledge of God: God is incomprehensible yet knowable. Second,
he draws on it within his development of his doctrine of the Trinity, drawing on the
language of absoluteness and personality in his description of the relationship between
the essence and persons. Throughout his treatment Bavinck seeks to demonstrate
how the Christian doctrine of God is unique in its ability to hold absoluteness and
personality together. And, as such, this brief exploration shows various ways that
Bavinck creatively appropriates modern philosophical concepts from within his
classical, Reformed tradition in order to develop them in and for the context of
modernity. Thus, more attention should continue to be paid to Bavinck’s articulation
of the relationship between absoluteness and personality. Some areas that remain
to be explored are how absoluteness and personality bear on Bavinck’s trinitarian
metaphysics, along with an understanding of how it grounds the possibility of divine
revelation as well as a more thorough investigation into the sources he draws on to
develop his doctrine of the Trinity. Finally, it’s also apparent that the cracks that start
to form in Bavinck’s appropriation need to be further studied. Does his reconciliation
ultimately fall apart because of the confusing application of person and personality
to the divine essence? In sum, this is a unique aspect of Bavinck’s treatment of the
doctrine of God that is wide open for further investigation.
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